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Unlocking Legal Validity: Some Remarks
on the Artiﬁcial Ontology of Law
Paolo Sandro
Abstract Following Kelsen’s inﬂuential theory of law, the concept of validity has
been used in the literature to refer to different properties of law (such as existence,
membership, bindingness, and more), and so it is inherently ambiguous. More
importantly, Kelsen’s equivalence between the existence and the validity of law
prevents us from accounting satisfactorily for relevant aspects of our current legal
practices, such as the phenomenon of “unlawful law.” This chapter addresses this
ambiguity to argue that the most important function of the concept of validity is
constituting the complex ontological paradigm of modern law as an institutional-
normative practice. In this sense, validity is an artiﬁcial ontological status that
supervenes on that of the existence of legal norms, thus allowing law to regulate
its own creation and creating the logical space for the occurrence of “unlawful law.”
This function, I argue in the last part, is crucial to understanding the relationship
between the ontological and epistemic dimensions of the objectivity of law. Given
the necessary practice-independence of legal norms it is the epistemic accessibility
of their creation that enables the law to fulﬁll its general action-guiding (and thus
coordinating) function.
1 Introduction
Can anything interesting at all still be said on the topic of legal validity (“validity”
hereinafter)? Many scholars would reply negatively, given that this concept has been
at the forefront of the jurisprudential debate for the last few decades, in particular as
one of the elected “battlegrounds” between legal positivists and nonpositivists. The
real scope of this debate has been far from clear, however, for what positivists and
antipositivists have been debating are the “grounds of validity,” rather than the
concept of validity per se (Sartor 2000). Does this suggest then that any form of
P. Sandro (*)
Business School, University of Salford, Salford, UK
e-mail: p.sandro@salford.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2018
P. Westerman et al. (eds.), Legal Validity and Soft Law, Law and Philosophy
Library 122, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77522-7_5
99
consensus on the concept has been reached? Hardly so, as shown by the different
contributions in this volume.
As we shall see, due mostly to what is a major misconception in Kelsen’s
inﬂuential theory, “validity” has been used to refer to different properties of law.
The result is that the use of the concept in legal discourse is inherently ambiguous,
and so it is still unclear what is at stake when we discuss it. My aim in this chapter is
to dispel this ambiguity in order to reveal what I see as the most important function
played by the concept of validity, namely constituting the complex ontological
paradigm of modern law as an institutional-normative practice. Far from being “a
mere summary-concept” (von der Pfordten, in this volume), validity is an artiﬁcial
ontological status that supervenes on that of existence of legal norms, thus allowing
law to regulate its own creation. This function, I argue in the last part, is crucial to
our understanding of the relationship between the ontological and epistemic
dimensions of the objectivity of law. Given the necessary practice-independence
of legal norms, it is the epistemic accessibility of their creation that enables the law to
fulﬁll its general action-guiding (and thus coordinating) function.
The chapter proceeds as follows: in Sect. 2, I analyze the source of ambiguity in
Kelsen’s equivalence of existence, validity, and bindingness of law and show its
counterintuitive consequences vis-à-vis our current legal practices. In Sect. 3, I offer
some remarks on normative ontology and in particular on the difference between the
epistemic and metaphysical conditions of existence of norms. This allows me, in
Sect. 4, to illustrate the difference between the validity and the existence of legal
norms and thus to account coherently for the mysterious status of “unlawful law.”
Lastly, in Sect. 5, I show the function played by validity within this complex
ontology and how it is ultimately connected to the objectivity that characterizes
our modern legal practices.
2 The Ambiguity About Validity
2.1 The Source of the Ambiguity
“Validity” appears to be one of those concepts for which it is easy to provide
examples—“this contract is valid”—but whose deﬁnition proves a considerably
harder task. While in general parlance the property of being “valid” indicates the
state of being in accordance with a set of criteria (Beltrán and Ratti 2010), thus
distinguishing between “good” and “bad” tokens of a certain type or between
members and nonmembers of a certain set, the use of the concept in legal discourse
has proved difﬁcult to account for consistently. Carlos Santiago Nino (1996, p. 117),
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to mention but one, has identiﬁed at least six different “cores of meaning” in which
validity is used1:
– as existence;
– as binding force;
– as applicability;
– as conformity;
– as membership;
– as efﬁcacy.
Nino (1996, p. 118) notes how these “cores of meaning” are not fully autonomous
but rather often presented in various combinations—thus contributing to the ambi-
guity surrounding the use of the concept. Lamond (2014a, p. 113) too observes that,
at least in common law jurisdictions,
[t]he language of validity is ordinarily used to make three types of claim about a legal rule:
(i) that is it legally effective (has legal force); (ii) that it is a member of this legal system
(a valid rule of English Law); and (iii) that is validated by another law (valid under the
relevant primary legislation, not ultra vires). There is an important relationship between the
three, inasmuch as the standard explanation for why a rule has legal force is that it is a
member of the system in question, and the most common basis for a rule being a member of
the system is that it is validated by another rule of the system. Validation gives rise to
membership, and membership qualiﬁes a rule for normative force. But it is the normative
force of rules – their legal effect – that is fundamentally associated with validity (italics
original).
I begin by stressing that, as a preliminary methodological matter, the fact that
three (or more) properties have “an important relationship” does not warrant the use
of one and the same concept for referring to them.2 More importantly, the ambiguity
surrounding the use of this concept goes to a deeper, metatheoretical, level. For two
very different questions about law have been simultaneously addressed by it, a
“theoretical” and a “normative” one (Peczenik 1989, p. 175). That is, in some
cases, validity is conceived of as the hallmark—the “speciﬁc mode of existence”
as we shall see—of law: as Raz (1979, p. 146) puts it,
a rule that is not legally valid is not a legal rule at all. A valid law is a law, and invalid law
is not.
Here validity is used in a descriptive manner. In other cases instead, validity
means a normative, prescriptive judgment regarding legal norms: to say that a norm
is valid is to say that it ought to be followed or applied. A ﬁrst level of confusion
arises when these two different types of discourse—descriptive and prescriptive—
are not kept properly distinguished. This leads us to Hans Kelsen.
1According to Sartor (2000, 2008) validity should instead be understood as expressing a “doxastic
obligation”: that rule R is valid means that we ought to accept rule R in our legal reasoning.
2See Ferrajoli (2007, pp. 56–57) on why syntactic clarity is a matter of the utmost importance in any
analytical reconstruction of law.
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2.2 The Ambiguity in Kelsen
In what might be one of the most quoted excerpts in modern legal theory, Kelsen
(1946, p. 30) afﬁrms:
to say that a norm is valid, is to say that we assume its existence or – what amounts to the
same thing – we assume that is has “binding force” for those whose behavior it regulates.
Thus, existence, validity, and binding force of law are synonymous; to wit, they
express the same property.3 Or, as Guastini (2016) puts it, there seems to be
“conceptual identity” between the three properties. Before looking at the implica-
tions of this identiﬁcation, it is worth noting how, according to Ferrajoli (2016),
Kelsen’s semantic ambiguity about validity originates in a higher-level syntactic
ambiguity due to his use of the term “norm”. Even though Kelsen (1960) clearly
recognizes the fundamental distinction between normative acts—as acts of will that
belong to the Sein—and norms, which are of those acts the meaning and belong to
the Sollen, he denotes both of them with the same term “norm.” This in turn means
that for him (and his followers on this point) it is conceptually impossible to
distinguish between the validity of the act that produces the norm and that of the
norm itself: hence the equivalence between existence and validity of norms.
What then of the further equivalence with binding force? The passage above is
used, among others, by Nino (1978, p. 358) to argue that Kelsen does not hold a
purely descriptive concept of validity, but a normative one. In this sense, to predicate
the validity of a norm is to make an evaluative judgment about its obligatoriness and
justiﬁcation, that is, to prescribe that the norm ought to be obeyed.4 The problem is
that such an evaluative stance runs against the postulate of purity of Kelsen’s theory
(Guastini 2016, p. 403). Things are not better if, following Bulygin (1998), we
understand Kelsen’s validity as expressing merely a positive legal obligation, for in
this case we preserve the purity of the theory at the cost of running into the problem
3Kelsen is not alone in confusing validity for something else: while natural lawyers “tend[ed] to
identify legal validity with justice”, so that “a norm is ‘properly’ valid only if it is coherent with
certain objective values,” legal realists identify validity with efﬁcacy, so that valid norms are only
those “implemented in society” (Pino 1999, p. 535). A notable exception is Finnis (2011,
pp. 25–29) who, following Aquinas, recognizes the distinction between the existence of positive
law—depending on a valid enactment—and its full validity that depends on its “derivation” from
natural law.
4It is interesting to note that when validity is predicated of moral and social norms, it seems to be
meant exclusively in the normative sense—we claim that a moral or social norm is valid when we
are saying that it ought to be obeyed. For if we were instead to use validity to address the ontological
dimension, the concept would be simply redundant: there is no ontological status other than that of
existence for moral and social norms. Anne Ruth Mackor points to me that German terminology
seems to warrant my contention, because even though we cannot say of a social norm that it is
Gültig (since it is not enacted in accordance with certain criteria), we can say nonetheless that is has
Geltung, which means that it exists and it has binding force. This might help to explain the
widespread ﬂattening of the ontological question onto the normative one in legal discourse, and
the resulting equation between validity (in the sense of existence) and bindingness.
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of the necessary extralegal or nonnormative character of the Grundnorm (Guastini
2016, p. 404). In short, either way, the theoretical coherence of Kelsen’s theory is
compromised.5
2.3 The Results of the Ambiguity
For the purposes of this chapter, nothing hinges on whether Kelsen’s notion of
validity is, after all, descriptive or normative. What matters instead is that in either
case, the ambiguous nature of his notion of validity (and of his notion of “norm”
before that) yields far-reaching consequences for our understanding of modern legal
systems. In particular, the equivalence between existence, validity, and bindingness
entails on the conceptual level that
(I) all existing legal norms are also always valid and binding;
(II) invalid legal norms do not exist and have no binding effect;
(III) all that is necessary for a legal norm to be valid and thus binding is the (formal)
validity of its source.
These three theses are hard to reconcile with our current legal practices.
(I) implies that validity and binding force become part of the very deﬁniens of
“legal norm” so that to talk of a nonbinding legal norm amounts to a contradiction in
terms (Peczenik 1989, pp. 175–176). Yet even if we conceive of bindingness in
purely legal terms, we know that such contradiction does not hold as a matter of
logical necessity (in our modern legal systems at least): just think about the
disapplication of domestic norms that are in conﬂict with European Union legisla-
tion. Such norms retain their full validity (provided they had it in the ﬁrst place) and
yet “lose” their bindingness (or force of law).
(II) instead makes it impossible to coherently account for a great number of legal
norms (as contained in statutes, secondary legislation, or administrative acts) that
might be declared invalid by a court at some point and yet have been part of the legal
system—and might have produced legal effects—for a while.6
(III) has the even more paradoxical effect of preventing Kelsen from fully
exploring what is likely one of his greatest contributions to legal theory, namely
the identiﬁcation of the static as well as dynamic character of modern legal systems
(Ferrajoli 2016).
Kelsen in fact shows us that one of the distinguishing characteristics of law as a
normative order is that it regulates its own creation. It does so through the “chain of
5See Nino (1996, p. 119). MacCormick (2008, p. 162) states that bindingness is not validity, but
“one of the consequences” of it.
6See Kelsen’s (1992, pp. 72–73) strained attempt to account for “rechtswidriges Recht” in terms of
the contemporary validity of “alternative provisions” (both the valid and the invalid one). In this
sense legal norms would always have an implicit alternative clause: see the rebuttal of this idea in
Guastini (2016).
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validity,” which pertains not just to the forms of the acts that produce norms but also
to the content of those norms. Yet if we identify the sufﬁcient condition of validity of
legal norms with the validity of the acts that produce them, it does not actually matter
whether the content of those norms will conﬂict hierarchically with that of the
superior norms.7 In other words, the material validity of a norm—its conformity
with higher norms—becomes irrelevant as it is neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient
condition for the existence of the act that produces it (Ferrajoli 2016, pp. 92–93).
This leads us to the striking realization that, if we were to take Kelsen at face value
on this point, the concept of validity would be ultimately “completely worthless”
(Guastini 2016). Is this really the case?
Before we look at the structure of modern legal systems to see whether validity is
really a dispensable concept that plays no real function in our understanding of law,
we need to clarify what sense of the “existence” of norms is at stake here.
3 Some Remarks on Normative Ontology
As I have mentioned already, the discussion about validity is muddled not only by
terminological differences, but also by some deeper conﬂicts pertaining to the
metaphysical nature of norms that are not always brought to the surface of the
discussion. In particular, the idea of the “existence” of norms is in many respects
puzzling: it amounts to one, if not to the main driver of the naturalistic explanation of
law that we know (in its many variants) as legal realism.8 For one thing, norms do
not exist in the same way as material objects do as they lack, for instance, mass. In
this sense, norms are “mysterious beasts” (Brennan et al. 2013, p. 2) and are more
akin to so-called abstract objects, such as mathematical entities and properties (Berto
and Plebani 2015). The puzzling metaphysical nature of norms has become relevant
again in legal theory since the introduction of linguistic and conceptual analysis and
of the key distinction between norms and norm formulations (Narváez Mora 2015).9
Once it was clariﬁed that norms cannot be the norm formulations through which they
are expressed—for norm formulations almost always underdetermine norms as their
7For the criticism that a purely source-based criterion can never help identify by itself “individual
legal norms” see Priel (2011). As we shall see, legal norms are actually always the product of the
interpretation of the act adopted according to the rules on its production.
8Most legal realists do not dispute that something we ought to call “law” exists in fact—what they
contend is that this institutional practice we call “law” is made (also) of metaphysical entities such
as norms. Rather, law is exclusively made of human behavior in their view, and as such it is
amenable to empirical observation.
9For a comprehensive and insightful discussion of the distinction and its ramiﬁcations see
Pino (2016).
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meanings10—the question of what kind of entities norms are does not seem to have a
readily available answer any longer.11
As Guastini (2013, pp. 146–147) points out, when we talk about the existence of
norms in jurisprudential discourse, we might be alternatively referring to two
different questions: (i) what does it mean that a norm exists, in general, and
(ii) when does a norm exist in a given legal system, that is, when does a norm
belong to it? The ﬁrst is a metaphysical question that refers to norms in general,
while the second is a contingent, positive question whose answer depends on the
legal system taken into account—as different legal systems have different criteria as
to the membership of their norms. Given space constraints, I will not be able to
discuss here all the ontological and metaontological commitments underlying the
following remarks,12 but I will nonetheless ﬂesh out a rough account of what it takes
for a (legal) norm to exist.
Let us start from the intuition that norms do not make sense as such until they are
expressed or formulated: in other words, they do not exist before someone expresses
them. As Kelsen (1949, pp. 483–484) holds, there are no normative principles in the
physical world, only regularities of behavior and physical laws (such as gravity). The
point is that these regularities and physical laws exist—and causally interact with the
world—independently of anyone observing and expressing them: they are strongly
mind-independent. The same cannot be said of normative principles. A normative
principle is such only if it can be potentially acted upon, that is, if it can make a
difference, by being taken into account, in the practical reasoning of the agent: and in
order to do so, it must be somehow expressed and recognized as such.13 In other
10Narváez Mora (2015) claims that legal norms “are not entities of any kind” and that the necessity
to look for the ontological “substance” of norms is what inevitably leads us into the rule-following
paradox. I address this worry in my forthcoming monograph on the distinction between creation and
application of law (Sandro 2019, forthcoming).
11This is a question that belongs to normative ontology in general, and not just to legal theory. I use
the deﬁnition of normative ontology to distinguish the approach outlined here from the one that
pertains to the social ontology of law, on which see the recent debate in Rechtstheorie with
contributions by Bernal, Canale, Ekins, and Tuzet. In particular, using Tuzet’s (2014) terminology,
here I am chieﬂy concerned with “entity-ontology,” while the social ontology approach deals with
“process-ontology.”
12As such a great deal of the analysis that follows is based on the nonreductive ontological account
of norms put forward by Brennan et al. (2013). While I do not necessarily subscribe to every
element of their proposal (especially when it comes to the analysis of legal norms), it does constitute
the most comprehensive account of normative ontology currently available in the literature—and it
does have a considerable edge over reductive accounts (like the ones that equate social norms with
the underlying practices). For a more general discussion of metaontology I refer the reader to the
formidable introduction to the subject by Berto and Plebani (2015). For an application of this line of
enquiry to law see Narváez Mora (2015) and Moreso and Chilovi (2016).
13I prefer the use of the term “expression” over “formulation” (the one favored by Guastini) given
that sometimes norms can remain “implicit,” that is not explicitly verbally formulated. Yet even
implicit norms must be somehow expressed (through behavior, with reactive attitudes for instance)
in order to acquire the capacity to ﬁgure in practical reasoning. I owe this remark to Sebastián
Figueroa Rubio and Anne Ruth Mackor.
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words, a normative principle must have some degree of epistemic accessibility if it
purports to guide conduct: as Raz (2011) afﬁrms, it must “be in the world.”14 And as
expression is an act of will, one could say then that the normative element in any
standard or general requirement is necessarily intentional.15
“Expression” seems to be then a necessary, albeit not sufﬁcient, condition for
something to be considered normative, for only with its expression does a norm
acquire the capacity to interact “causally” with the furniture of the world (Guastini
2013, p. 147).16 We can call this the expressive or epistemic condition of existence of
norms. In this ﬁrst sense, to afﬁrm that “norm N exists” means “someone expressed
N” (Guastini 2013, p. 147).17 This might be why many think that norms are a
particular kind of abstract object, namely “linguistic entities,” and as such bear a
special relationship to language (Moreso and Chilovi 2016; Pino 2016).18 But is this
all there is to the existence of norms? Is it enough that someone—anyone—
expresses or formulates a deontic requirement and this fact alone grounds its
existence qua norm?19
While expression is a necessary condition of the existence of all norms, it is
clearly not a sufﬁcient one. I could indeed let you know that “people ought not to
listen to music in this city,” which is a syntactically and semantically well-formed
deontic requirement. But my utterance could only express a genuine norm in light of
something else being the case: for instance, if there is a moral principle that prohibits
people from listening to music in this city or if the person uttering the deontic
sentence is the sovereign of the system and so forth. Thus, in this second sense, to
say that norm “N” exists means “something metaphysically grounds normative
principle ‘N.’” We can call this the metaphysical or grounding condition of the
existence of norms. This grounding relation obtains always between a norm and a
“grounding fact,” which in turn seems to change depending on the type of norm we
are considering (von Wright 1963):
• Moral norms: here there is a preliminary distinction to be drawn depending on
whether we are talking about an objectively valid moral norm or a norm of
positive morality of a given social group.
– Critical morality: a norm “N” exists if there is an objective normative principle
“N” of morality. Here, in other words, we have the conceptual identity
14Cf Brennan et al. (2013, p. 31). On how post-modern law is progressively losing its previous
mode of “being in the world” see Walker (2009).
15For Gaus (2014) norms are “human [normative] artifacts.” Cf also Gardner (2012, pp. 59–65,
85–86).
16Gardner (2012, p. 86) seems to limit this necessary positive character of norms to legal ones, but I
do not see any reason for such limitation. See also the quote by Samuel Pufendorf about the
existence of “moral entities” in Westerman’s contribution to this volume.
17This understanding of ontological parlance in arithmetical terms seems to be similar to the one by
Moreso and Chilovi (2016).
18Cf Narváez Mora (2015, pp. 43–44).
19For an introduction to metaphysical grounding see Tahko and Lowe (2015).
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between the truth maker and the proposition that expresses the normative
requirement, the problem being instead the existence and epistemic accessi-
bility of such grounding facts (one must be a moral realist, broadly
understood).
– Positive morality: if we consider instead a given social group in a given
moment in time, a norm “N” exists if the corresponding normative attitudes
are displayed by a “signiﬁcant proportion” of members of the group (and a
signiﬁcant proportion knows about this) (Brennan et al. 2013, p. 29).
What is important to point out is that in both cases, the relevant norm “N”
exists but is independent from the underlying N-practice—that is, the social
practice that sees “N” as its object, or practice of “N”-ing. This is clear in the
case of the norms of critical morality, which—postulating the existence of the
corresponding objective normative principles—bind irrespectively of the mental
states of their addressees, but it is also what, according to Brennan et al. (2013,
pp. 58–59), distinguishes the norms of positive morality of a group from its social
ones.20
• Social norms: a social norm “N” exists in a given social group if a signiﬁcant
proportion of members of the group accept “N” and this acceptance is known to a
signiﬁcant proportion of members of the group—so that there is an (at least
presumed) N-practice.21
• Legal norms: a legal norm “N” exists if it belongs to legal system S, for its
existence is tantamount to the membership of the system (Pino 2016; Nino 1996).
Now what it takes for a norm to belong to system “S” is a contingent question, the
answer to which will be different from system to system. The key point for our
purposes—and what distinguishes legal norms (qua formal or institutional)22
from moral or social ones (informal)—is that, in this case, the creation and change
and eventual demise of norms is regulated by a second set of rules belonging to
20The difference between norms of positive morality and social ones lies in the fact that the former
“are constituted by [normative] attitudes that are necessarily practice-independent,” while the latter
are “necessarily practice-dependent.” In this respect it is worth pointing out that for these authors
social norms only entail presumed corresponding social practices (p. 76) and not actual ones, thus
allowing for the possibility of “universal error” (Gaus 2014) on the existence of such corresponding
practices. Now while I agree with Brennan et al. and with many others (see for instance Perry 2015,
p. 284 fn.3) that to identify social norms with the corresponding practices amounts to a serious
category mistake (to the extent that it is not the case that the existence of a practice is ever sufﬁcient
to generate a social norm), I am not convinced that a corresponding social practice needs only be
presumed (and not actually obtain) for a social norm to exist. For the purposes of this chapter
however nothing fundamentally hinges on this point.
21Here (as well as before with norms of positive morality) I leave it open whether this knowledge
condition requires common or merely mutual knowledge amongst members of the group. For an
insightful discussion about the acceptance of social rules see e.g. Perry (2015).
22Institutionalized normative orders—such as those of a company, or of an association—are to be
considered in this respect more similar to law than moral and social orders, as it makes indeed
perfect sense to speak of a “valid norm of that association” if by this we refer to the (institutional)
fact grounding the creation of such a norm (MacCormick 2008, p. 160).
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the system itself (Hart’s secondary rules) that are administered by some type of
authority. Law is in this sense reﬂexive or autonomous. To put it with Kelsen
(1946, p. 132), one of its distinguishing features is that it regulates its own
creation and application. As such, a legal norm “N” is practice-independent
vis-à-vis the corresponding social practice “N” (as much as an equivalent objec-
tive moral norm “N1”).23
There seems to be then a key difference between moral and legal norms on the
one hand and social ones on the other. The latter, but not the former, are necessarily
metaphysically practice-dependent. In other words, a moral or legal norm does not
necessarily need a corresponding social practice (not even a presumed one) to exist.
This leaves their expression (or formulation) as the only epistemic dimension they
might ever “possess,” given that the corresponding social practice might never
develop.24 This is clearly shown in the case of legal norms, for example, those that
in most countries around the world prohibit the ﬁle sharing of copyrighted material.
The fact that people do actually share and download illegally copyrighted material
on a regular basis—so that the corresponding social practice cannot be said to exist,
not even presumably—does not falsify, by itself, the assertion that such legal norms
exist (and are valid).
Why is this relevant? According to my analysis, expression is the only ontolog-
ical (qua epistemic) condition that norms of all kinds share. But for moral and legal
norms, given their practice-independence, expression might be and remain their only
epistemic display—that is, the only way they might “be in the world” to interact with
it. Two conclusions stand out then: ﬁrst, that for these two kinds of norms, it is even
more the case that to afﬁrm that they exist is tantamount to saying that someone has
expressed or formulated them25 and that, because of it, the possibility and circum-
stances of their expression become the real “battleground” in relation to their
23While legal norms are practice-independent when considered atomistically vis-à-vis their
corresponding N-practices, the legal system as a whole is not so—it is dependent on a different,
(general) S-practice of recognizing the authority of the system and on its acceptance by the majority
of members of the group. So there seems to be always a social (conventional?) fact that ultimately
grounds legal norms and that is not present for objective moral norms, which marks once again the
difference between law and (critical) morality. Brennan et al. (2013, p. 49) express this difference
(in what seems to me a more convoluted way) by claiming that formal norms (of which legal norms
are a subset) need only involve de re normative attitudes, and not de dicto ones. See furthermore on
the concept of “systemic acceptance” Lamond (2014b). This remark seems also to map onto the
distinction drawn by Canale (2014, p. 307) between the social practice which originates a legal
system and that must be characterized by “collective intentionality” and the subsequent social
practice that “warrants the existence of a legal system over time” but need not be characterized by
any such “joint action.”
24We might see epistemic manifestation in the potential judicial decision that applies and enforces
the norm, but this is also a manifestation of the underlying S-practice underpinning the authority of
the system.
25Someone with (normative and not just epistemic) authority, that is. This signals another difference
with social and positive morality norms, namely that in this latter case, given their practice-
independence, it does not really matter who formulates them (formulation works only as a
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existence. In the case of norms of critical morality, the question is whether there are
such things as objective moral facts (or goods) and, if there are, whether (and how)
we can access them. In the case of legal norms instead, the question is whether
whoever formulated the norm had the authority to do so and whether this expressive
act was carried out within the formal and material requirements imposed by the
higher-ranking norms in the system. This brings us back to the concept of validity.
4 Explaining the Validity Vis-à-vis the Existence of Law
Incidentally, the topic of validity is an example of a certain degree of insulation
sometimes displayed by Anglo-American jurisprudential scholarship vis-à-vis its
continental and Latin American counterparts. Consider again the paradigmatic
statement by Raz (1979, p. 146), for whom a rule that is not legally valid is not a
legal rule at all. Like many others in Anglo-American scholarship, Raz identiﬁes the
validity of law with its existence. Only valid law belongs to the legal system; invalid
law does not. In this regard, laws are like stones: “a non-existent stone is not a stone,
though we can talk about such stones and describe some of their properties as we can
do about invalid rules” (Raz 1979, p. 148). But is an invalid law necessarily not
“law”? Intuitively, one can point to all those instances in our current legal systems in
which invalid legal acts—like statutes or administrative measures—may still yield
normative consequences, at least until the moment when they are annulled or
repealed by a court. These acts, albeit invalid, do belong to the legal system—they
have some relationship or status within it (Guastini 2013, p. 132).
While the distinction between the existence and the validity of law has come to
the fore of Anglo-American scholarship only very recently,26 it has instead been
accepted and discussed for quite some time in continental and South American
scholarship, following the seminal work of scholars such as Eugenio Bulygin,
Luigi Ferrajoli, and Carlos Nino. These scholars have pointed out that Kelsen’s
conﬂation of the existence of a legal norm with its validity conceals what amounts to
the key innovation brought about by modern constitutional systems, namely the very
possibility of existence of what has been aptly termed by Ferrajoli (2007) “unlawful
“proxy” for the corresponding practice). The same does not clearly apply to law, as we shall see
shortly.
26This is mainly due to a series of recent contributions by Matthew Grellette. His work, although
commendable, cannot “rescue” Anglo-American jurisprudence from the charge of insularity: while
Grellette presents the distinction between the existence and the validity of law as “unexplored”
(Grellette 2010, p. 38), this distinction has been put forward and discussed in Continental and Latin-
American jurisprudence for over 30 years. This does not seem to be due to a lack of resources in
English—as Pino’s (1999, p. 535) article in Law and Philosophy discusses Ferrajoli’s idea that the
“mere enactment [of a legal norm] does not coincide with validity.” Similarly, there is no reference
to Munzer’s important book Legal Validity (1972) where, almost 40 years before Grellette’s work,
Munzer clearly distinguished not only between formal and material validity (p. 25), but also
between the existence and the validity of legal norms (pp. 37–43).
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law,”27 something that would amount to a contradiction in Raz’s (and Kelsen’s)
theory.28 Yet this constitutes possibly the most striking feature of modern juridical
phenomenology: it points to the fact that there are limits to what even the highest
legislative authority in a legal system can do—and these limits are legal ones, as
established in some sort of constitutional settlement (usually codiﬁed and entrenched
but not necessarily). As such, there are some things that as a matter of law the
legislator cannot do (Grellette 2010, pp. 26–31): an idea simply unentertainable if we
consider the idea of sovereignty as expressed by Bodin (1586) with the idea of
potestas legibus soluta and that still nowadays proves hard to reconcile with the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty in English constitutional scholarship.29
4.1 Formal and Material Validity
Only by distinguishing between the existence and the validity of law can we truly
understand the meaning of the latter—a property that refers to the conformity of both
acts and norms to the hierarchically superior norms governing their production. As
already mentioned, in its most general understanding, the property of being “valid”
indicates the state of being in accordance or conforming with something. The ﬁrst
step toward understanding how “unlawful law” is even conceivable is to recognize
that in institutional-normative systems, validity (as conformity) can assume two
different dimensions, the formal and the material one. According to Pino (2014,
p. 207), the former pertains to
the attainment of the formal/procedural conditions regarding the exercise of law-making
power, according to which a certain text can be considered as a legal source. Formal validity
usually coincides with a successful “enactment”, and it can be ascertained by means of a
factual inquiry about the realization of the relevant law-making procedures (italics mine).
Hence, a bill that is not approved by the Italian Parliament following the pre-
scribed procedure (for instance, a constitutional bill that is approved through the
ordinary legislative procedure) is not formally valid, and the Italian Consulta (the
Constitutional Court) can quash it (article 136 of the Italian Constitution). Another
ﬁtting example is that of a written contract that is lacking one of its essential
elements, such as the signature of one of the contracting parties (when this is
required by law). Material validity, instead,
27This is my translation (Sandro 2011) of the original Italian expression “diritto illegittimo.” For a
discussion of the concept of “unlawful law” see Grellette (2010, p. 36).
28Grellette (2010, p. 32) correctly recognizes that early positivists like Austin or Hart took as
paradigmatic cases legal systems whose criteria for validity were based purely on conventional
practice and hence it would be uncharitable to make too much of their failure to distinguish between
existence and validity. The same cannot be said of later positivists, and especially of Kelsen.
29Think about the discussion which ensued after recent decisions such as R (Jackson) v Attorney
General [2005] UKHL 56 and AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46.
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obtains when a legal norm is coherent (or at least not conﬂicting) with the relevant higher-
rank legal norms. Plainly, material validity is not a matter of fact, but a matter of interpre-
tation: it depends on the content, on the meaning of the relevant norms. More precisely, it
requires interpreting both the norm whose validity is to be ascertained, and the (higher)
norms that act as the parameter for the validity of that norm (Pino 2014, p. 208).
Going back to the example of a statute, if the normative content of a formally
valid statute violates one of the provisions in the Italian Constitution—for instance,
by unduly limiting the freedom of the press to publish news about the current
government—then the Consulta will be able again to strike the statute down. The
same applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of contracts: if a contract, for instance,
has an illegal purpose (the infamous contract for murder), no judge will hold that
contract valid and enforce it. It is important then to stress how formal validity and
material validity work on different levels, pertain to different objects, and are a
product of different epistemic endeavors.
As Table 1 illustrates, formal validity pertains to normative sources—acts—and
requires the attainment or application of certain formal/procedural conditions to
validly exercise a power recognized by the law.30 As such, it is ascertainable through
an empirical enquiry (whether the bill has received royal assent, for instance).31
Material validity, on the other hand, pertains to norms themselves and requires
(at least) the noncontradiction between the content of norms so produced and the
relevant, higher, norms. If we look at our current legal practices, this ﬁrst distinction
Table 1 Formal and material validity compared
Formal validity Material validity
Pertains to Sources Norms
Requires Attainment Coherence or
noncontradiction
Ascertained
by
Empirical enquiry (plus minimal interpretive
operation)
Interpretative operation
30By including both formal and procedural conditions in the deﬁnition of formal validity I intend to
account for a common ambiguity in legal language between “act” as the process of production of it
(i.e. the legislative process) and “act” as the product of such process (i.e. the statute): see Ferrajoli
(2007, pp. 494–498).
31As has been noted, even here there is some degree of interpretive activity, as the formal norms on
production will be used to verify the correct procedure and form of the law-making act (Ferrajoli
2007, pp. 524, 577). This remark points to the more general idea that norms, as meanings, are
always and only the product of interpretation, an idea that is expressed, for instance, by many legal
realists of the Genoa School (following Giovanni Tarello) and, more recently by Pino (2016,
pp. 24–26). In this sense it would be more correct to claim that norms would not exist before
interpretation. This thesis, taken seriously, has far-reaching consequences for the (in)determinacy of
law thesis that cannot be discussed here: I only want to note that when it comes to the attainment of
formal or procedural norms, this interpretative activity can be considered minimal and predomi-
nantly linguistic.
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seems rather uncontroversial. What happens, though, when an act is formally valid
but the norm so produced is not materially so?
4.2 Formally Valid but Not Materially So—The Mysterious
Status of “Unlawful Law”
We have seen that for several Anglo-American legal theorists who have been
following Kelsen on the point, validity is existence and hence validity is binding-
ness. As has been shown instead by those scholars who warn of the unsatisfying
theoretical implications of Kelsen’s thesis (Munzer 1972; Ferrajoli 2007; Grellette
2010; Guastini 2016), this “ﬂattening” of validity with existence leads to a variety of
explanatory shortcomings that leave an important amount of legal practice unsatis-
factorily unaccounted for. This discussion has taken place mostly at the constitu-
tional level when some sort of “constitutional entrenchment” is present in a given
legal system. Interestingly, the distinction between formal and material validity is
operatively present even in common law jurisdictions where such constitutional
entrenchment is missing—for bylaws, administrative acts, and contracts can all have
either formal/procedural or material requirements. Yet its general importance and
role as to the ontological status of legal norms in our modern systems has been
manifestly undertheorized. Validity in the formal sense only obtains when all the
formal requirements on the production of a given act (a contract, a statute, a judicial
decision, or a will) are attained by the agent(s) in producing it. Guastini (2013,
p. 132) aptly reminds us that, “in lawyers’ talk,” validity means precisely the absence
of “vices.”32 But what about the case in which only some of those formal/procedural
requirements are attained?
Take the example of a will: a clear formal requirement for a will to be valid is that
it is signed (often necessarily in front of some witnesses) by its testator. Now, think
about a will whose signature has been forged—it was signed not by its testator but by
her nephew, who also (coincidentally) appears to be now the beneﬁciary of the entire
estate. The will looks like a formally valid one to the nonexperts—only an experi-
enced calligrapher would be able to ascertain that it was not actually signed by the
supposed testator. It is hard to deny that, until the moment in which a judge declares
the will invalid because it lacks one of its essential formal requirements, that will
exists—that is, it belongs to the legal system. For one thing, the nephew might have
brought some possession claims on the estate on the basis of the forged will. Unless
the legitimate heirs to the estate can somehow prove immediately that the will is
forged, it is likely that the court will, prima facie, grant the nephew possession of the
estate. But even more to the point, the very fact that a court takes the will into
32See also Beltrán and Ratti (2010, p. 605) for the claim that “for a rule to be legally valid it must
have been produced in a ‘legally impeccable way’, or is a logical consequence of some impeccably
produced rule, and is in any case compatible with superior rules.”
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consideration and declares it invalid implies in the ﬁrst place that some type of act
that is intelligible as having a juridical meaning (Ferrajoli 2007, p. 528) must have
been produced and hence, for this fact, exists for the legal system. This seems also
conﬁrmed by the traditional deﬁnition of a nullity in law as an act that must be
treated as if it had never existed or taken place. This logically implies that for a
certain amount of time, and precisely from the moment t0 of creation to the moment
t1 of declaration of nullity by the judge, an act juridically meaningful existed for the
legal system.33
When is it that a will does not even exist for the law then? If we observe our
juridical practices, that would be when such a supposed will lacks even some of
those foundational requirements that allow for its very recognizability as a juridical
(type-)act—for instance, a will that lacks the written form. If someone were to tell me
in person that she wants to leave her estate to her older child but not to the younger,
reckless one, I would never take that to be a speech-act that has any legal relevance
whatsoever. Even though my friend is genuinely moved by the desire to make her
intentions regarding her estate manifest, no one in her sound mind would take such
a speech-act as constituting an enforceable legal act. In other words, the
requirement of the written form is so fundamental when it comes to the concept of
a will that in its absence there is really nothing we can talk about from the legal point
of view.34,35
33Cf Pino (2016, pp. 24–25). For the purposes of the present chapter, I am leaving aside the
discussion regarding the effects of such acts for the system (that is, the difference between nullity
and annullability/voidability).
34Some civil law expert could rebut: what about nuncupative wills though? It is indeed true that a
handful of jurisdictions around the world recognize the existence of oral wills, although they do so
only in extreme circumstances where there is no possibility to redact a document following certain
formalities. This is the “pure” nuncupative will, that is an oral will whose existence does not depend
of any formality whatsoever. It is limited to soldiers at the front and seamen at sea when the death of
one of them is imminent. The fact that in these situations no formal requirements whatsoever are
requested by the law for the existence and hence validity of the will can be explained by the greater
moral bond that arguably develops between human beings before a situation of great peril or
danger—like a war or a tempest at sea—and thus by the fact that in these situations one can expect
the recipient of the oral will to report it verbatim to the authorities. Alas, the possibility of a
completely invented will being reported is still looming here, and that is why some commentators
argue that in these cases it would still be preferable to leave the distribution of the estate of the
deceased according to the rules of inheritance in the given jurisdiction (see Prascina 2009).
35It is also true that the oral form was indeed accepted in Roman law. But this did not mean that
someone could just report someone’s words claiming they were his testamentary dispositions;
rather, there were always some procedural requirements—the oral statement, for instance, had to be
given in front of a considerable number of witnesses (usually seven) none of whom was going to
become a beneﬁciary (Prascina 2009). What we have experienced is precisely the evolution of the
institution of the will from the oral form to the written one. The reasons for this evolution are the
same (i.e. epistemic) that underpin the key relevance of understanding validity as a different status
from existence in our legal practices. Thus it is safe to say that barring truly exceptional situations,
any existing will must be written. If the ordinary fellow tells a group of friends about his
testamentary intentions and considers that speech-act to be his “will” (and so to have normative
effects once he passes away), not only does he not know the law and fails to produce any normative
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4.3 The Artiﬁcial Ontology of Modern Law
The discussion above points to a key aspect of the difference between juridical
existence and nonexistence in modern legal systems. For the vast majority of legal
acts (contracts, statutes, administrative and judicial decisions, wills, etc.), most of
their necessary requirements to exist in the legal system will be knowable and
ascertainable by laypeople and not by legal ofﬁcials only.36 Anticipating my main
claim in the next section, the point is that we can shed light on the complex
ontological status of modern law only if we bring to the surface the underlying
epistemic issues. Whether a norm belongs prima facie to the legal system or not must
be, in normal situations, tendentially knowable and ascertainable by rational and
linguistically competent agents in the system. This amounts to a necessary condi-
tion—given the practice-independence of legal norms—for law to be tendentially
objective and thus able to guide the conduct of its addressees.37
Whether a feasible inheritance intention has been expressed in written form is
something that any person of sound mind can ascertain, and so is whether the
document has been signed or not.38 The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to statutes:
if the British Prime Minister were to publish a Facebook post with a list of general
rules addressed to the public and claiming these were new statutory law, one would
take her as either
a) reporting a very recent legislative development no one has ever heard of; or
b) joking; or
c) being delusional.
The point is that no one would think that her speech-act could possibly constitute
a statute or legislative provision, and if someone did, well that someone would
arguably lack the very concept of a statute.39 Whether a bill has been correctly
approved by a given parliamentary commission or whether the signature at the
effect regarding the distribution of his assets—more importantly, one could wonder whether his
concept of “will” is not defective altogether. True, the friend’s speech-act could have several other
effects—for example, that of prompting a change in her younger child when he is told about his
mother’s intentions—but that does change the fact that it cannot by any means purport to have the
effects that the legal system acknowledges when a valid token of the (type-)act “will” is performed.
36The distinguishing line between requirements that are necessary and sufﬁcient for an act to be
existent, and those that are necessary for its formal validity, is a thin one, and seems to resist precise
theoretical treatment.
37Cf Brennan et al. (2013, p. 10). See also Westerman in this volume: her distinction between type-
and token-validity maps onto the one between existence and full validity (albeit from a different
viewpoint).
38Whereas the question of whether the signature at the bottom of a speciﬁc will has been forged or
not is something that only an expert might be able to verify (provided that the forgery is apt, of
course).
39At the very least, a statute is a set of general norms addressed to the public and produced by a
prima facie legitimate authority according to some given procedure, be it a monarch, a president, a
parliamentary assembly, and so forth.
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bottom of it by the monarch or the president of the republic is present or not is again
an empirical question that can in principle be answered by a great many people in our
modern legal systems.
In short, the distinction between (mere) existence and formal validity of an act is
premised on the observation that existence requires the application of some of the
essential formal norms on the production which make the ensuing (product-)act
juridically intelligible to every rational and linguistically competent agent in the
system.40 If that act also contains a norm formulation that expresses a deontic
sentence, we can say then that a new norm that belongs prima facie to the system
has been created. An act that exists for the legal system yields a juridical meaning
that is recognizable as such by laypeople and ofﬁcials alike. It might be lacking some
formal elements that are necessary to be considered formally valid, or its content
might contradict some higher norm and thus be materially invalid, but at this stage it
is still the case that upon the mere attainment of some formal/procedural require-
ments, this act has the potential to produce a change in the normative landscape of its
addressees.41 It is prima facie a source of law.
Table 2 below illustrates the complex ontology of modern law,42 which is the
result of the fundamental distinctions between acts (as containing norm formula-
tions) and norms (as the meaning of those acts) and between their respective
existence and validity. According to this model, validity can be predicated of two
different entities: of acts (formal validity) and of norms (material validity). The
former is (predominantly) a matter of empirical conformity, the latter of interpretive
coherence or noncontradiction (Ferrajoli 2016, p. 85). This means that every time
someone refers to law as being valid with no further speciﬁcations, she usually
means the combination of both—a statute is valid only insofar as it is so both
formally and materially. This consideration allows us also to make intelligible the
status of “unlawful law”: that is, all those statutes, regulations, bylaws, judicial
decisions, and so forth that albeit extant within the system might be actually invalid.
As such, the existence of a legal norm (and of the act by which it is expressed) does
not imply its validity. Existence is a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition of validity.
40Carpentier’s contribution in this volume is another very laudable attempt to dispel the ambiguity
surrounding the use of the concept of legal validity in legal discourse. While he precisely identiﬁes
the distinction between the membership (within a system) of a legal norm as its existence and
conformity to “higher-ranking norms” as validity, he still terms both of these properties as (two
different types of) “validity,” hence somewhat carrying on the ambiguity. I must also confess that I
am somewhat not entirely convinced by his claim that conformity with criteria of membership
(i.e. existence) is “not a normative, but a conceptual kind of conformity” (original italics). For I do
not see any qualitative difference between the test for existence and the test for validity of legal
norms in modern constitutional systems (although the former is logically prior to the latter).
41Cf Gardner (2012, p. 61).
42Cf Pino (2016, p. 42).
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Two remarks are in place at the end of this section. Interestingly (and perhaps
ironically, given that this chapter is premised on a critical reading of this author),
each of the remarks seems to vindicate an important intuition by Kelsen. First, the
analysis shows in what sense validity can be conceived of as the speciﬁc mode of
existence of legal norms vis-à-vis social and moral ones. Once validity is “released”
from its normativist declination, we are able to appreciate that “valid” is a second
and “artiﬁcial” ontological status that legal norms—qua formal or institutional—can
entertain beyond that of “existence.” In this sense, validity is a property that
originates necessarily from the institutional character of a system of norms43—it is
a relationship between norms and the acts that create them (Pino 2016, p. 106). This
is the way in which law regulates its own creation, which for Kelsen is precisely one
of the distinguishing features of law in respect of other normative systems.
The second and generally undertheorized44 point that our analysis underscores is
that, in our modern legal systems, a norm has force of law already with the mere
existence of the act that produces it and not just with its (full) validity. Granted, it is
necessarily a prima facie force, or, to put it more aptly, there is a presumption of
force of any norm produced by an act that exists within the system.45 That pre-
sumptions only stands until a norm is scrutinized by a court as the court will not
enforce invalid norms, only valid ones.46 But it appears as an undeniable descriptive
truth about our legal practices that, until an invalid act is brought before a relevant
Table 2 The artiﬁcial ontology of modern law
Existence Formal validity Material validity
Pertains to Acts (sources)
Norms (contents)
Acts (sources) Norms
(contents)
Requires Attainment of at least
some essential
elements
Conformity Coherence or
noncontradiction
Ascertainable
by
Every rational agent
(in normal situations)
Juridical operators (ofﬁcials, law-
yers, etc.)
Courts
Ascertained
through
Empirical inquiry
(plus minimal inter-
pretive operation)
Empirical enquiry (plus minimal
interpretive operation)
Interpretative
operation
Normative
effect
Force of law Force of law (enforceability if
there are no material norms
curtailing the contents)
Force of law and
enforceability
43On the institutionality of law the locus classicus is MacCormick (2008); for a very recent take see
Ehrenberg (2016).
44A notable exception is Ferrajoli (2007, p. 528).
45To use Westerman’s terminology in this volume, this would be the function of type-validity
(as opposed to token-validity).
46In reality, it is perfectly possible for a court or tribunal to make an error of law and enforce an
invalid norm. If that mistake of law is not rectiﬁed by appellate courts, we might well have a change
in the law. But the overall objectivity of the system allows us to properly recognize these
occurrences for what they are, mistakes of law (at least at ﬁrst).
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ofﬁcial for the authoritative declaration of its invalidity, such an invalid act might
nonetheless produce normative effects like the equivalent valid one.47 Hence, pace
Kelsen, validity and force of law are independent properties that do not entertain any
relationship of entailment. An invalid norm, as long as the act producing it exists for
the system, can exert force of law, and if it goes unchallenged, the normative
consequences thus produced might stand (Grellette 2010, p. 28). This also explains
why modern legal systems allow claimants who wish to challenge the validity of a
given act to seek “interim injunctions”—measures with which a court might crys-
tallize the (normative) status quo while the legal proceedings unfold and until a
decision is taken on the validity of the act in question. This central feature of our
current legal practices would make no sense if invalid acts were to be considered
nonexistent (and thus unable to produce any effect whatsoever).
5 Validity and Objectivity: On the Epistemic Dimension
of Law
This chapter started off with the demonstration of how one of the greatest jurispru-
dential minds has fundamentally misunderstood the relationship between the exis-
tence, validity, and bindingness of law. This has subsequently led many more in the
literature astray. I have also shown that the consequences of this mistake cannot be
possibly underestimated. For validity becomes either a redundant concept that bears
no real explanatory capacity vis-à-vis our modern legal practices, leaving a great deal
of them unaccounted for, or it must be understood as the expression of an evaluative
judgment that implies some form of “ethical legalism” or “ideological positivism”
(Guastini 2016). Instead, once properly distinguished from “existence” and con-
ceived of as part of a complex ontological paradigm, the concept of validity is a key
element to shed light on the inner structure and workings of modern legal systems
(vis-à-vis other normative practices).
In this sense, law is widely held to be, as an institutional-normative practice, a
means of social organization and control: not the only one, and not necessarily the
best one, but a speciﬁc one (Kelsen 1941). The speciﬁcity of law lies in subjecting
human conduct to the guidance of norms (Fuller 1969), in this way providing its
addressees with reasons for action. Green (1998, p. 121) and Gardner (2012,
pp. 205–211) have claimed that law might be a modal and not a functional kind: it
would be deﬁned and identiﬁed not by what it does (for other normative practices
such as morality or custom perform the same function) but by how it does it. On this
point, I stand by Ehrenberg (2009, p. 97) instead when he afﬁrms that
47This to the point that, after a certain period of time has passed, such effects might be “stabilized”
by the legal system itself in order to endure certainty and protect the bona ﬁde expectations of third
parties: cf MacCormick (2008, p. 162).
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[w]hat is unique may be neither its form (modality) nor its function but instead the particular
way in which the two are joined.48
The “particular way,” as I noted above, is to use norms to guide people’s conduct.
This practice might originate from the spontaneous dynamics of a given social
group, but once it reaches a certain dimension and level of complexity, the set of
(primary) norms as established within those spontaneous practices will no longer be
able to effectively and satisfactorily work as a means of group organization and
control. Here, of course, I am just picturing in broad strokes Hart’s (2012) recon-
struction of the evolution from premodern legal systems to modern ones through the
union of primary and secondary rules, which I fully endorse.49 What is important for
our purposes is that the evolution from a set of (social) primary norms to a system of
primary and secondary norms entails the ontological independence of those primary
norms from the corresponding practices, of which these latter are the most obvious
epistemic manifestation in spontaneous social settings. In other words, insofar as
social norms are informal and entail the corresponding practices, members of the
group have a reliable and conspicuous epistemic source to ﬁnd out what they ought
to do. But when instead the creation of new norms becomes an institutionalized
process in the hands of a particular subject (i.e., group leaders or an assembly), a new
norm “N” can be created and thus exist even if no one (in the most extreme case) in
the social group displays the corresponding “N”-normative attitudes.50 Norms thus
created are fully posited precisely because there is no necessary relation with the
corresponding practices. This requires in turn the centralization of coercive enforce-
ment within the group to “cope” with physiological norm breaching by some
members of the group.51 The positivization of norm creation and the centralization
of coercive power appear to be then inextricably related to one another. As Postema
(2011, p. 307) puts it:
[w]ith law comes the institutionalization and centralization of governance or exercise of
political power.
The result of these processes is twofold. On the one hand, the positivization of
norm creation requires the social group to introduce new norms (and change existing
ones) in a way that is epistemically accessible through the institutionalized exercise
48Later in the piece Ehrenberg deﬁnes law as a “social kind.”
49
“Rule” and “norm” are synonymous for the purpose of this chapter. On the most appropriate way
to read Hart’s normative “genealogy” see Postema (2011, pp. 306–307). My conclusions are also
convergent with Westerman’s account of validity as reputation in this volume. In particular see her
considerations about the functional advantages entertained by formal institutional orders vis-à-vis
informal ones.
50As I said, this does not exclude that the social group must somehow accept the normative-
institutional system in the ﬁrst place. Without that basic systemic acceptance, there would be no
possibility for norms to be detached from their corresponding practices.
51In the absence of spontaneous reactive attitudes that come when the practice is there instead. But if
the majority fails to comply with the norms coming from the power-holder(s) all the time, one can
reasonably doubt whether a legal system is in place at all.
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of authority (see Westerman in this volume). In other words, legal norms thus
created are ontologically grounded in forms or processes that are empirically
observable. This is famously captured by the Hobbesian maxim auctoritas, non
veritas, facit legem.52 On the other hand, at this ﬁrst stage, whatever content can be
poured into the form of the law; to wit, at this stage, law merely channels the exercise
of political power, which remains (potentially) unfettered (Ferrajoli 2016). It is only
then with a second and artiﬁcial ontological dimension—validity—that law itself
regulates its own creation, so that there are legal limits to what the authority can and
cannot do. And it is precisely with this limitation of law by law that also comes
logically the possibility of “unlawful law,” which has proved so hard to reconcile
with positivist theories of law (Grellette 2010, pp. 28–37).
Perhaps what many positivists have struggled with is the fact that legal norms are
produced through an empirical act of creation but also entertain a normative
relationship of validation with superior norms (Lamond 2014a; Raz 1979, p. 150).
This presupposes Kelsen’s binary typology of normative systems that are either
“dynamic” (where validity depends on the procedure of creation of that norm) or
“static” (where a norm is logically derived from other norms in the system).53 As
should be clear by now, our modern legal systems—no matter whether based on the
civil or common law tradition—are static and dynamic at the same time (Ferrajoli
2007; Beltrán and Ratti 2010): there are two logically independent modes of
validation of legal norms—one source based (or formal), the other content
based—that are at work simultaneously because of two expedients. First, this is
because the source-based criterion of validation is already by itself sufﬁcient to give
rise to the force of law for the norms thus produced, at least prima facie. Second,
while the ascertainment of the fundamental elements of legal acts (such as statutes,
contracts, wills, etc.) that constitute their recognizability as sources of law can be
carried out by every rational and linguistically competent member of a group, the
authoritative decision of “invalidation” for the norms thus produced is reserved for a
closed group of specialized agents within the system. In other words, unless an act
(source) is challenged before the authority entitled to pronounce on its validity, that
potentially less-than-valid act might yield the same normative effects as a valid
one.54
Episodes like these happen regularly in our legal practices. And taken individu-
ally, each of these instances of “invalid law” that still produce normative effects
constitutes a shortcoming of the system, a glitch. But the very possibility of
“unlawful law” (and of its occurrences) must be understood as the price we have
to pay to have an institutional-normative system that regulates its own change while
52The maxim appears for the ﬁrst time in the 1670 Latin translation of Leviathan (1651):
Hobbes (1839).
53Kelsen’s use of “static” seems very different from Hart’s (2012, pp. 92–93).
54Contra Kirste, in this volume, according to whom only valid law has the “force of law.” As I have
shown in this chapter, this claim seems hard to reconcile with our current existing legal practices.
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being (tendentially) objective and thus allowing for predictability and certainty.55
The always potential and irreducible tension between the two independent processes
of validation of legal norms is resolved by a default rule according to which the
source based prevails over the content based, unless there is a supervening author-
itative act (by a court) that sanctions the invalidity of the act in question. To put this
in Kelsenian terminology, the static character of the system is partially sacriﬁced to
its dynamic one (Ferrajoli 2007, 2016; MacCormick 2008, p. 162). Its internal
coherence—which would require the logical impossibility of “unlawful” law—is
sacriﬁced toward its certainty and predictability, two features that are necessary to
fulﬁll its guiding function of subjecting human conduct to the guidance of rules
(Peczenik 1989, p. 174).
Could this be any different?56 If “force of law” were only a predicate of the full
validity of a norm and not just of the existence of its source, a normative system
could fulﬁll its guiding function only through the following two “routes.” Either it
would be possible for ofﬁcials to express an ex ante authoritative judgment of
validity, both formal and material, for every (token-)act that purports to produce
normative effects as recognized by the law, or such authoritative judgments of
validity would not have to be reserved to a restricted group of specialized agents
(the courts), but would instead have to be diffused, in the sense that every agent in the
system could authoritatively establish what is valid and thus binding law. The
unavoidable problems these two possibilities should be apparent. As to the ﬁrst
possibility, it is not clear how a state of affairs in which ofﬁcials perform an ex ante
validity control on each and every act of law creation would be achievable in our
large societies, whereas in the second case, law would lose even that (minimal) type
of objectivity, that is, intersubjectivity, and become an unavoidably subjective
practice: one in which everyone in the system is able to say what the law is—even
the lunatic (Jori 2010). I guess there is no need to stress how such a system—if we
can talk indeed of a “system”—would hardly achieve any action-guiding function at
all as no one could reliably form any expectation vis-à-vis the behavior of others.
6 Conclusion
Once released from its normative (mis)understanding, the concept of validity
assumes a completely different explanatory role vis-à-vis our modern legal practices.
As an artiﬁcial ontological status that legal norms can possess beyond that of (mere)
existence, it allows law to regulate itself (rather than being just the form of exercise
of political power), thus creating the logical space for the existence of the only
apparently contradictory “unlawful law.” This is a crucial point toward shedding
55Granted, a system could not fulﬁll any guiding function if the instances of “unlawful law” were to
go beyond a certain, “manageable,” threshold.
56See for a similar discussion Guastini (2013, pp. 131–135).
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light on the relationship between the ontological and the epistemic dimensions of
objectivity of modern legal practices. In this sense, due to the ontological practice-
independence of legal norms, the institutionalized creation of law must be epistemi-
cally accessible for objectivity—which Kramer (2007, p. 46) has termed
“transindividual discernibility”—to obtain. In other words, the fact that the existence
of a source of law depends on formal, empirical features that are in the majority of
situations ascertainable by every rational agent in the system (like the written form of
a deed or the fact that it has been signed and so forth) grounds the status of law as a
tendentially objective (that is, intersubjective) practice. Importantly, this objectivity
is grounded not only on the practice of the ofﬁcials of the system, as is often held, but
on the practice of laypeople as well.57 This is the epistemic importance of easily
identiﬁable conventional rules that Hart (2012, p. 134) stresses in the Concept as it is
this characteristic that allows the law to fulﬁll its general action-guiding (and thus
coordinating) function. A given deed is easily recognizable as a source of law (that
is, as a token of the juridical type to which the system assigns the production of
certain normative consequences) due to the occurrence of some formal characteris-
tics. A statute approved according to the required voting procedures and promul-
gated in the ofﬁcial gazette is law, whereas a list of norms published on Facebook is
not law (at least for the time being).58 It is this kind of epistemic objectivity that, at a
minimum, grounds the rule of law.59
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“Whenever such a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and ofﬁcials are provided
with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation [. . .] The existence of this
[simple form of] rule of recognition will be manifest in the general practice, on the part of the
ofﬁcials or private persons, of identifying the rules by this criterion” (Hart 2012, pp. 100–101). It
has been noted already for quite some time that Hart is ambivalent in the Concept as to whether the
rule of recognition is grounded on the practice of ofﬁcials only, or on that of laypeople as well. I
submit here that this ambiguity is due precisely to Hart’s lack of distinction between the existence
and the validity of law. Once such a distinction is in place, we can understand Hart’s claims as
describing not a single, but two rules of recognition, one that provides the criteria for the existence
of law (this is sometimes called the “rule of identiﬁcation”), and the other that provides the criteria
for its validity.
58See again the important contribution by Westerman in this volume. Granted, even the existence
and not just the validity of some types of formal acts will be too complex to be ascertained by the
nonspecialized members of society; but this technical, more restricted class of acts will still be
conceivable only if the general practice of recognizing law’s existence holds for the majority of acts
in the system.
59For an extensive discussion of the relationship between objectivity and the rule of law see
Kramer (2007).
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